No. 82288-3

SUPREME COURT FOR THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

CITY OF FEDERAL WAY,
Respondent,

v.

DAVID KOENIG,
Appellant

RESPONDENT CITY OF FEDERAL WAY'S BRIEF IN RESPONSE TO AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF OF ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WASHINGTON STATE

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1. INTRODUCTION

The Attorney General agrees with the City of Federal way that:

- The [*Nast*[1]] Court found that "the [PRA[2]] definitions do not specifically include either courts or case files" and that "we find that they are not within the realm of the [PRA]."[3]

- Although the legislature has amended the [PRA] on a number of occasions during that time [since the *Nast* decision], including its renaming and recodification as the PRA, none of the amendments have extended the definition of "public agency" to courts or judicial branch units of government[.][4]

- The Legislature was presumably aware of *Nast* and under this Court's case law, is presumed to have acquiesced in the judicial interpretation of the [PRA] as not extending to court records.[5]

- The applicability of the *Nast* principle to non case court records would be consistent with the analysis of the *Nast* decision and with the rationale behind it[.][6]

Despite this agreement, the Attorney General asserts that it is not good policy to exclude courts and all court records from the PRA.

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[1] *Nast v. Michels*, 107 Wn.2d 300, 304-05, 730 P.2d 54 (1986).

[2] The Public Records Act, currently codified at chapter 42.56 RCW. The public records statutes were recodified in 2006 as the Public Records Act. Prior to 2006, the statutes were located in the Public Disclosure Act ("PDA"). For consistency, references from pre-2006 decisions to the PDA have been changed to the PRA. See Appendix A for a cross-reference chart comparing the provisions formerly in chapter 42.17 RCW with the recodified provision in chapter 42.56 RCW.

[3] Brief of Amicus Curiae Attorney General ("AG Br.") at 3.

[4] AG Br. at 3.

[5] AG Br. at 4.

[6] AG Br. at 7.

Whether it is good policy to exclude the courts from the PRA, however, is not the issue before this Court. The Court ruled on this issue 22 years ago when it decided *Nast* and held that courts "are not within the realm" of the PRA.[7] The Legislature has adopted this Court's interpretation of the PRA by amending the definitional statutes in the PRA numerous times without ever adding courts to the definition of "agency" or court records to the definition of "public records." This silence stands in stark contrast to instances where the Legislature has disagreed with this Court. In those instances, the Legislature has taken swift and unambiguous action, even listing a specific PRA case in a statutory intent section. There was no such reaction to *Nast*. As a result, the Legislature has acquiesced and adopted the Court's holding in *Nast*. Any policy arguments must therefore be directed at the Legislature.

The issue before the Court requires the Court to interpret the Legislature's actions.[8] And the Legislature's decision to adopt the Court's holding in *Nast* controls the result in this case. Accordingly, the Court should affirm the trial court's ruling.

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[7] *Nast*, 107 Wn.2d at 306.

[8] The Court could also testify before the "Sunshine Committee." See RCW 42.56.140 (creating the Public Records Exemptions Accountability Committee, commonly known as the Sunshine Committee). Or the Court could adopt court rules to govern access. But the Court should not use a court decision to implement such rules.

2. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT IN RESPONSE TO AMICUS

In *Nast*, the Court was faced with the issue of whether court case files in the possession of a county agency were subject to the PRA. The Court held that those records were not subject to access under the PRA.

The threshold issue for the Court in interpreting the PRA was whether the courts are "agencies." The Court concluded that courts are not agencies, and consequently the case files were not public records because case files were not prepared, owned, used, or retained by an "agency."

Additionally, the Court could not interpret the PRA in a way that would have limited its holding to just case files because there is nothing in the definition of "public record" to allow for any distinction between case files and other court records. Therefore, the Court was left to interpret the PRA to exclude case files (and, necessarily, all other court records).

The Court's reference to the right of common-law access to court records, the absence of the term "courts" or "case files" in the PRA definitions of "agency" and "public record," and the existing protections for selected case files were all grounds the Court relied on to interpret the PRA to exclude courts. There were no independent grounds to support the result.

Any policy arguments supporting the application of the PRA to court records are exactly that – policy arguments. The Legislature has adopted the *Nast* court's definition of "agency" to exclude courts, so the Attorney General will need to make his policy arguments to the Legislature.[9]

3. ARGUMENT

3.1 Under the Legislature's Definitions in the Public Records Act, Courts Are Not "Agencies" and All Court Records Are Not "Public Records."

3.1.1 The crux of the *Nast* decision is that Courts are not agencies under the PRA.

In *Nast v. Michels,*[10] the Supreme Court held that the PRA did not apply to courts or court records. While the exact issue before the Court was whether case files in the possession of a county executive branch agency were subject to the PRA, the Court reached the conclusion that those case files were not subject to the PRA by interpreting the definitions of "agency" to exclude courts. Because courts are not agencies as defined in the PRA, court records are not "public records" as defined in the PRA.

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[9] The City does not address separation of powers issues related to the Legislature's authority to require the Courts to disclosure their records because that is not what the Legislature has done. Even if the separation of powers doctrine would limit the Legislature's authority to apply the PRA to the courts, there is no such limitation on the Legislature exempting the courts from the PRA.

[10] *Nast v. Michels*, 107 Wn.2d 300, 304-05, 730 P.2d 54 (1986).

The Court's interpretation of "agency" was not dicta – it was the crux of the Court's holding. This is because on their face, the court case files fit into the definition of "public records"[11] – they were "writings"; they were "related to the conduct of government"; and, they were retained by a local agency, the King County Department of Judicial Administration. Moreover, "case files historically have been referred to as public records."[12] Nothing in the definition allows for any distinction between case files and other court records.

The Court could not and did not hold that case files were not "writings." The Court could not and did not hold that case files did not "relate to the conduct of government." Instead, the Court could and did interpret the term "agency" to exclude courts. It held that a county agency was "within the judicial realm" and thus was, like all courts, "not within the realm of the [PRA]."[13] If courts are not agencies, the case files (and all other court records) are not prepared, owned, used or retained by an "agency" and therefore outside of the definition of "public record."

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[11] "Public Records" are defined as "any writing containing information relating to the conduct of government or the performance of any governmental or proprietary function prepared, owned, used, or retained by any state or local agency." RCW 42.56.010(2); RCW 42.17.020(42).

[12] *Nast*, 107 Wn.2d at 305.

[13] *Nast*, 107 Wn.2d at 305.

The only interpretation of the PRA that would have allowed the Court to reach the result the Court reached is for the Court to have interpreted the term "agency" to exclude courts. There is no suggestion, nor any credible reading of the term "public record" that would have excluded case files absent this interpretation of "agency." If a court is an "agency," then all court records are public records. If a court is not an agency, then none of its records are public records.

Because the Court was forced to resolve the issue by interpreting the definition of "agency," it could not limit its holding to case files. Instead, case files, like all court records, are not public records only because courts are not agencies. The Attorney General's invitation to somehow make courts "agencies" for one set of court records but not for another set of court records[14] is not possible. Courts are either agencies under the PRA or they are not. *Nast*, *Buehler*, *Spokane and Eastern Lawyers* and the Legislature (through acquiescence) all conclude that courts are not agencies.

[14] AG Br. at 8.

3.1.2 The *Nast* Court relied on three factors, not as separate grounds for its holding, but as interpretive tools to support its conclusion that under the PRA, courts are not agencies.

While it could be argued, as noted by the Attorney General, that "the *Nast* opinion is not altogether clear,"[15] it is clear that the Court based its ruling on its interpretation of the PRA. The *Nast* Court looked to three factors to support its conclusion by holding:

> the [PRA] does not apply to court case files because [1] the common law provides access to court case files, and [2] because the [PRA] does not specifically include courts or court case files within its definitions and [3] because to interpret the [PRA] public records section to include court case files undoes all the developed law protecting privacy and governmental interests.[16]

In other words, the Court's interpretation of the PRA is supported by these three reasons. **First**, there was already a common law right to access most court records, so it was not necessary to include courts in the PRA. **Second**, courts and case files are not included in the PRA definition of "agency" and "public record" – if they were, it would have been dispositive – so there is no direct evidence that courts are included in the PRA. **Third**, it would have been harmful to include court records in the PRA because it would undo existing common law protections for privacy in court records.

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[15] AG Br. at 5 n.1.

[16] *Nast*, 107 Wn.2d at 307.

The Court's emphasis on these three conclusions should not be read as impendent grounds for its ruling – instead they are three of the interpretive tools the Court relied on to reach its conclusion that courts are not agencies and their records are not public records.

3.1.3 The Legislature has acquiesced to the holdings in *Nast, Buehler* and *Spokane and Eastern*.

It is undisputed that the Legislature has not changed the definitions of "agency" or "public records," despite having amended the definitional statutes on numerous occasions since the *Nast* opinion. Nor has the Legislature in any way tried to amend the PRA to add courts in any other manner. As the Attorney General notes, this acquiescence means the Legislature has adopted the Court's interpretation. The Court cannot reinterpret the Legislature's determination.

But the doctrine of legislative acquiescence is not limited to rulings by the Supreme Court – it applies equally, whether the decision is a Court of Appeals decision or Supreme Court decision. *See State v. J.P.*, 149 Wn.2d 444, 455, 69 P.3d 318 (2003) (holding that the Legislature's failure to amend a statute after a Court of Appeals decision interpreting the statute amounted to legislative acquiescence to the ruling).

It is also without argument that Division II (in January 2007)[17] and Division III (in February 2003)[18] both interpreted *Nast* to hold that courts are not agencies and thus all court records, not just case files, are not subject to the PRA. More specifically, Division II held "that under *Nast*'s reasoning, the Spokane County Superior Court is not an agency under the [PRA.]"[19] Division III held "**neither** courts **nor** court case files are specifically included in the [PRA] and are not within its realm."[20]

When the Legislature amended the definitional sections of the PRA in 2005,[21] it was presumably aware of not only *Nast*, but also Division III's ruling in *Buehler* that applied *Nast* to all court records. And when the Legislature added the PDA definitions of "agency" and "public record" into the PRA in 2007,[22] it was presumably aware of not only *Nast* and *Buehler*, but also Division II's holding in *Spokane & Eastern* that all

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[17] *Spokane & Eastern Lawyers v. Tompkins*, 136 Wn. App. 616, 622, 150 P.3d 158 (2007).

[18] *Beuhler v. Small*, 115 Wn. App. 914, 918, 64 P.3d 78 (2003).

[19] *Spokane & Eastern*, 136 Wn. App. at 622.

[20] *Beuhler*, 115 Wn. App. at 918 (emphasis added). To the extent that the Attorney General is suggesting those holdings are more limited and only apply to the type of records at issue (see AG Br. at 9), there is no support in those decisions for a more limited application. Nor is there any way to interpret the PRA to apply to some, but not all court records. Finally, the Attorney General's suggestion that the PRA was "drafted primarily to deal with issues raised by the disclosure of executive branch records" (AG Br. at 10) is wrong – the PRA applies to over 2000 legislative bodies that govern Washington's local governments.

[21] Laws of 2005, Ch. 445 § 6.

[22] Laws of 2007, Ch. 197 § 1.

court records were outside of the PRA. Thus, the Legislature is presumed to have acquiesced to these Courts of Appeal interpretations as well as this Court's interpretation of the PRA in *Nast*.

The Legislature's silence in regards to *Nast* stands in stark contrast to how the Legislature has reacted to PRA decisions from this Court that it disagreed with. Following such cases as *Rosier*[23] and *Hangartner*,[24] the Legislature swiftly acted to change the law – and made it expressly clear in the legislative history that it was seeking to overrule the Courts' decisions.[25] There was no such reaction to *Nast*, even though the Legislature subsequently amended the PRA's statute that contained the definitions of agency and public record on nine separate occasions.

3.2 The Policy Reasons Cited by the Attorney General Cannot Supply Authority for This Court to Undo or Limit *Nast* Because the Legislature Has Adopted the *Nast* Court's Limited Definition of Agency.

The Attorney General states that he "shares Koenig's concern that *Nast* not be treated as a 'blanket' exemption of non-case judicial records from public disclosure[.]"[26] Because of this policy concern, the Attorney General suggests that the Court treat court records as public records but

[23] *In re Rosier*, 105 Wn.2d 606, 717 P.2d 1353 (1986).

[24] *Hangartner v. City of Seattle*, 151 Wn.2d 439, 90 P.2d 26 (2004)

[25] Laws of 1987, Ch. 403 §1 (stating legislature's intent to overrule *Rosier*); Final Bill Report for 2SHB 1758, Laws of 2007, Ch. 483 (citing *Hangartner* and its holding that the legislation was overruling).

[26] AG Br. at 8.

adopt limits to protect case files or redefine "agency" to include courts, but only to the non-case files.

3.2.1 This case is not appropriate for reinterpretation of "policy."

The Attorney General's policy concerns are not the legal authority that justify changing the law. This Court cannot "second-guess the legislature in cases where the wisdom of its acts seems questionable." *Andersen v. King County*, 158 Wn.2d 1, 40, 138 P.3d 963 (2006). Moreover, this Court "should resist the temptation to rewrite an unambiguous statute to suit our notions of what is good public policy[.]" *State v. Jackson*, 137 Wn.2d 712, 726, 976 P.2d 1229 (1999).

By repeatedly amending and even recodifiying the definitions in the PRA, but failing to add courts to the definition of "agency" after this Court's ruling in *Nast*, the Legislature has made the policy decision that courts should be excluded from the PRA. Only the Legislature can change this – not this Court.

3.2.2 The Court can change policy by seeking a legislative change or adopting court rules.

The Court may agree with the Attorney General that it is bad policy not to have clearly defined rules for access to court records. If that is the case, the Court can remedy that situation. The Court can petition the Legislature or make a recommendation to its Sunshine Committee. Or the

Court can adopt court rules to allow for access.[27] But the Court should not remedy the situation by adopting new rules for access through a court decision. And even if the Court were to take such action, it should only have these rules apply prospectively to not unfairly penalize Federal Way taxpayers.

4. CONCLUSION

This case is not about what the *Nast* Court should have held. It is not about what the law should be. It is not about what policy should be implemented. And it is not about what the rules should be.

This case is about what the *Nast* court did hold – that Courts are not "agencies." And it is about how the Legislature responded, effectively codifying *Nast* through acquiescence. This Court's and Legislature's decisions control, and accordingly this Court should affirm the trial court.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 29th day of May, 2009.

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[27] *Washington State Bar Ass'n v. State*, 125 Wn.2d 901, 890 P.2d 1047 (1995) (holding court rules trumped legislative enactment seeking to subject the bar association to the authority of the Public Employee Relations Commission); *Washington State Council of County & City Employees v. Hahn*, 151 Wn.2d 163, 86 P.3d 774 (2004) (holding that court rule was not inconsistent with legislative enactment giving the Public Employee Relations Commission jurisdiction over courts, and thus the Commission had jurisdiction).

Appendix A

Cross-Reference Guide for the 2006 Recodification of the Public Records Act

FOSTER PEPPER PLLC

CROSS-REFERENCE GUIDE FOR 2006 RECODIFICATION

Contact: Ramsey Ramerman 206-447-4674

PUBLIC DISCLOSURE ACT (PRE- JULY 1, 2006) ➤➤➤➤ PUBLIC RECORDS ACT (AFTER JULY 1, 2006)

PDA (until 7/1/06)	PRA (after 7/1/06)
42.17.020	42.56.010
42.17.250	42.56.040
42.17.251	42.56.030
42.17.253	42.56.580
42.17.255	42.56.050
42.17.258	42.56.060
42.17.260	42.56.070
42.17.270	42.56.080
42.17.280	42.56.090
42.17.290	42.56.100
42.17.295	42.56.110
42.17.300	42.56.120
42.17.305	42.56.130
42.17.310	42.56.210
42.17.310(1)(a)	42.56.230(1)
42.17.310(1)(b)	42.56.230(2)
42.17.310(1)(c)	42.56.230(3)
42.17.310(1)(d)	42.56.240(1)
42.17.310(1)(e)	42.56.240(2)
42.17.310(1)(f)	42.56.250(1)
42.17.310(1)(g)	42.56.260
42.17.310(1)(h)	42.56.270(1)
42.17.310(1)(i)	42.56.280
42.17.310(1)(j)	42.56.290
42.17.310(1)(k)	42.56.300
42.17.310(1)(l)	42.56.310
42.17.310(1)(m)	42.56.270(2)
42.17.310(1)(n)	42.56.480(1)
42.17.310(1)(o)	42.56.270(3)
42.17.310(1)(p)	42.56.320(1)
42.17.310(1)(q)	42.56.330(1)
42.17.310(1)(r)	42.56.270(4)

PDA (until 7/1/06)	PRA (after 7/1/06)
42.17.310(1)(s)	42.56.340
42.17.310(1)(t)	42.56.250(2)
42.17.310(1)(u)	42.56.250(3)
42.17.310(1)(v)	42.56.330(2)
42.17.310(1)(w)	42.56.350(1)-(2)
42.17.310(1)(x)	42.56.360(1)(a)
42.17.310(1)(y)	42.56.360(1)(b)
42.17.310(1)(z)	42.56.270(5)
42.17.310(1)(aa)	42.56.270(6)
42.17.310(1)(bb)	42.56.270(7)
42.17.310(1)(cc)	42.56.370
42.17.310(1)(dd)	42.56.250(4)
42.17.310(1)(ee)	42.56.250(5)
42.17.310(1)(ff)	42.56.380(1)
42.17.310(1)(gg)	42.56.270(8)
42.17.310(1)(hh)	42.56.360(1)(c)
42.17.310(1)(ii)	42.56.480(2)
42.17.310(1)(jj)	42.56.270(9)
42.17.310(1)(kk)	42.56.390
42.17.310(1)(ll)	42.56.330(3)
42.17.310(1)(mm)	42.56.330(4)
42.17.310(1)(nn)	42.56.330(5)
42.17.310(1)(oo)	42.56.360(1)(d)
42.17.310(1)(pp)	42.56.400(1)
42.17.310(1)(qq)	42.56.320(2)
42.17.310(1)(rr)	42.56.240(3)
42.17.310(1)(ss)	42.56.230(4)
42.17.310(1)(tt)	42.56.270(10)
42.17.310(1)(uu)	42.56.410
42.17.310(1)(vv)	42.56.320(3)
42.17.310(1)(ww)	42.56.420(1)
42.17.310(1)(xx)	42.56.430(1)

PDA (until 7/1/06)	PRA (after 7/1/06)
42.17.310(1)(yy)	42.56.430(2)
42.17.310(1)(zz)	42.56.430(3)
42.17.310(1)(aaa)	42.56.440
42.17.310(1)(bbb)	42.56.420(2)
42.17.310(1)(ccc)	42.56.420(3)
42.17.310(1)(ddd)	42.56.420(4)
42.17.310(1)(eee)	42.56.400(2)
42.17.310(1)(fff)	42.56.270(11)
42.17.310(1)(ggg)	42.56.330(8)
42.17.310(1)(hhh)	42.56.270(13)
42.17.310(1)(iii)	42.56.600
42.17.310(1)(jjj)	42.56.270++
42.17.310(1)(jjj)	42.56.380++
42.17.310(1)(kkk)	42.56.380
42.17.310(2)-(4)	42.56.210
42.17.311	42.56.510
42.17.312	42.56.360(2)
42.17.313	42.56.450
42.17.314	42.56.335
42.17.315	42.56.320(4)
42.17.316	42.56.360(1)(e)
42.17.317	42.56.380(2)
42.17.318	42.56.240(4)
42.17.319	42.56.270(12)
42.17.31901	42.56.240(5)
42.17.31902	42.56.360(1)(f)
42.17.31903	42.56.400(3)
42.17.31904	42.56.400(4)
42.17.31905	42.56.400(5)
42.17.31906	42.56.460
42.17.31907(1)-(3)	42.56.380(3)-(5)
42.17.31908	42.56.270(19)

PDA (until 7/1/06)	PRA (after 7/1/06)
42.17.31909	42.56.380(6)
42.17.31910	42.56.360(1)(g)
42.17.31911	42.56.400(7)
42.17.31912	42.56.330(7)
42.17.31913	42.56.250(6)
42.17.31914	42.56.420(5)
42.17.31915	42.56.400(8)
42.17.31916	42.56.400(9)
42.17.31917	42.56.400(10)
42.17.31918	42.56.380(7)
42.17.31919	42.56.380(8)
42.17.31920	42.56.480(3)
42.17.31921	42.56.470
42.17.31922	42.56.590
42.17.31923	42.56.610
42.17.320	42.56.520
42.17.325	42.56.530
42.17.330	42.56.540
42.17.340	42.56.550
42.17.341	42.56.560
42.17.348	42.56.570
42.17.920	42.56.030

++ Laws of 2006 ch. 75, §2 and ch. 302, §11 both added a subsection (jjj) to 42.17.310(1)

(updated 12/04/07)

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CROSS-REFERENCE GUIDE FOR 2006 RECODIFICATION

Contact: Ramsey Ramerman 206-447-4674

PUBLIC RECORDS ACT (AFTER JULY 1, 2006) ➤➤➤➤ *PUBLIC DISCLOSURE ACT (PRE-JULY 1, 2006)*

PRA *(after 7/1/06)*	PDA *(until 7/1/06)*
42.56.010	42.17.020
42.56.020	New
42.56.030	42.17.251, .920
42.56.040	42.17.250
42.56.050	42.17.255
42.56.060	42.17.258
42.56.070	42.17.260
42.56.080	42.17.270
42.56.090	42.17.280
42.56.100	42.17.290
42.56.110	42.17.295
42.56.120	42.17.300
42.56.130	42.17.305
42.56.210	42.17.310(2)-(4)
42.56.230	42.17.310(1)(a); 42.17.310(1)(b); 42.17.310(1)(c); 42.17.310(1)(ss)
42.56.240	42.17.310(1)(d); 42.17.310(1)(e); 42.17.310(1)(rr); 42.17.318; 42.17.31901
42.56.250	42.17.310(1)(f); 42.17.310(1)(t); 42.17.310(1)(u); 42.17.310(1)(dd); 42.17.310(1)(ee); 42.17.31913
42.56.260	42.17.310(1)(g)
42.56.270	42.17.310(1)(h); 42.17.310(1)(m);

PRA *(after 7/1/06)*	PDA *(until 7/1/06)*
42.56.270 (continued)	42.17.310(1)(o); 42.17.310(1)(r); 42.17.310(1)(z); 42.17.310(1)(aa); 42.17.310(1)(bb); 42.17.310(1)(gg); 42.17.310(1)(jj); 42.17.310(1)(tt); 42.17.310(1)(fff); 42.17.310(1)(hhh); 42.17.31908 42.17.319
42.56.280	42.17.310(1)(i)
42.56.290	42.17.310(1)(j)
42.56.300	42.17.310(1)(k)
42.56.310	42.17.310(1)(l)
42.56.320	42.17.310(1)(p); 42.17.310(1)(qq); 42.17.310(1)(vv); 42.17.315
42.56.330	42.17.310(1)(q); 42.17.310(1)(v); 42.17.310(1)(ll); 42.17.310(1)(mm); 42.17.310(1)(nn); 42.17.310(1)(ggg); 42.17.31912
42.56.335	42.17.314
42.56.340	42.17.310(1)(s)
42.56.350	42.17.310(1)(w)
42.56.360	42.17.310(1)(x); 42.17.310(1)(y);

PRA *(after 7/1/06)*	PDA *(until 7/1/06)*
42.56.360 (continued)	42.17.310(1)(hh); 42.17.310(1)(oo); 42.17.312 42.17.316; 42.17.31902; 42.17.31910
42.56.370	42.17.310(1)(cc)
42.56.380	42.17.310(1)(ff); 42.17.317; 42.17.31907; 42.17.31909; 42.17.31909; 42.17.31918; 42.17.31919
42.56.390	42.17.310(1)(kk)
42.56.400	42.17.310(1)(pp); 42.17.310(1)(eee); 42.17.31903; 42.17.31904; 42.17.31905; 42.17.31908; 42.17.31911; 42.17.31915; 42.17.31916; 42.17.31917
42.56.403	New
42.56.410	42.17.310(1)(uu)
42.56.420	42.17.310(1)(ww); 42.17.310(1)(bbb); 42.17.310(1)(ccc); 42.17.310(1)(ddd); 42.17.31914

PRA *(after 7/1/06)*	PDA *(until 7/1/06)*
42.56.430	42.17.310(1)(xx); 42.17.310(1)(yy); 42.17.310(1)(zz);
42.56.440	42.17.310(1)(aaa)
42.56.450	42.17.313
42.56.460	42.17.31906
42.56.470	42.17.31921
42.56.480	42.17.310(1)(n); 42.17.310(1)(ii); 42.17.31920
42.56.510	42.17.311
42.56.520	42.17.320
42.56.530	42.17.325
42.56.540	42.17.330
42.56.550	42.17.340
42.56.560	42.17.341
42.56.570	42.17.348
42.56.580	42.17.253
42.56.590	42.17.31922
42.56.600	New
42.56.610	42.17.31923
42.56.900	New
42.56.901	42.17.963
42.56.902	New

Sections amended in 2007

42.56.010; 42.56.030; 42.56.140
42.56.270; 42.56.330; 42.56.335
42.56.360; 42.56.380; 42.56.400
42.56.430; 42.56.570; 42.56.580;
42.56.590; 42.56.904

(updated 12/04/07)

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Please see the attached:

"Respondent CITY OF FEDERAL Way's Brief in response to Amicus Curiae Brief of Attorney General of Washington State"

and Declaration of Service

Filed in ***City of Federal Way v. Koenig***, No. 82288-3, by

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